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Abstract. Cognitive scientists increasingly use virtual reality scenarios to address 
spatial perception, orientation, and navigation. If based on desktops rather than 
mobile immersive environments, this involves a discrepancy between the 
physically experienced static position and the visually perceived dynamic scene, 
leading to cognitive challenges that users of virtual worlds may or may not be 
aware of. The frequently reported loss of orientation and worse performance in 
point-to-origin tasks relate to the difficulty of establishing a consistent reference 
system on an allocentric or egocentric basis. We address the verbalisability of 
spatial concepts relevant in this regard, along with the conscious strategies 
reported by participants. Behavioural and verbal data were collected using a 
perceptually sparse virtual tunnel scenario that has frequently been used to 
differentiate between humans' preferred reference systems. Surprisingly, the 
linguistic data we collected relate to reference system verbalisations known from 
the earlier literature only to a limited extent, but instead reveal complex cognitive 
mechanisms and strategies. Orientation in desktop VR appears to pose 
considerable challenges, which participants react to by conceptualising the task in 
individual ways that do not systematically relate to the generic concepts of 
egocentric and allocentric reference frames.  
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 Introduction 
Imagine you are comfortably seated on your chair in front of your computer. On 
your computer screen, a virtual, winding journey unfolds through a short tunnel. At the 
end of the journey, your task is to point from your current position back to the 
journey's origin. Obviously, this is not a position currently shown on the screen. 
However, it is nowhere in the real world either; as a matter of fact, you never 
moved in your seat. Nevertheless you can provide an answer because you 
compensate by a mental representation of the scene as three-dimensional. Since 
the scene on the screen suggested a forward movement through the tunnel, you 
will imagine the tunnel's entrance as being somewhere behind you. Where you 
imagine this to be depends crucially on how your conceptualisation of navigating 
through the virtual space works.  
 Studying navigation in virtual reality (VR) is becoming increasingly 
popular in spatial cognition (Boccia, Nemmi, & Guariglia, 2014; Maguire et al., 
1999, Darken & Peterson, 2002, Stankiewicz et al., 2006, Török et al., 2014), 
even for investigating primates (Dolins et al., 2014) or rodents (Harvey et al., 
2009; Chen et al., 2013). There are obvious advantages; for instance, features of 
the environment (e.g. weather conditions, type and number of presented stimuli) 
can be controlled and manipulated to a much higher extent than any real world 
scenario could ever offer, and certain disabilities become irrelevant. VR can be 
combined with numerous other technologies, such as eye-trackers, fMRI, and 
EEG. However, these advantages come with a cost, especially if they necessitate 
immobility (as with most neurocognitive methods to date). Recent comparative 
studies consistently found that spatial orientation in even highly advanced 
stationary (such as desktop based) VR environments deviates from situations 
 involving actual movement. This affects performance in path integration tasks 
(Kearns, Warren, Duchon, & Tarr, 2002), map drawing (van der Ham, 2015), 
route learning (Ruddle et al., 2013) and wayfinding (Ruddle et al., 2011).  
Specifically, Riecke & Wiener (2007) and Riecke (2008) observed that 
many participants lose orientation in virtual navigation environments if they are 
not provided with real world features like physical motion or useful landmarks 
(Klatzky et al., 1998; Chance et al., 1998; Wraga et al., 2004). To perform well, 
participants often require extensive feedback training and/or explanations (e.g., 
Gramann et al., 2005; Riecke & Wiener, 2007; Wiener & Mallot, 2006). Such 
feedback has the effect of enhancing high-level cognitive processes including 
metacognitive consideration of the navigation experience. This may be more 
demanding and computationally more expensive as compared with similar 
experiences in the real world that require few if any cognitive resources (Presson 
& Montello, 1994; Farrell & Robertson, 1998). Indeed, Riecke and Wiener (2007) 
suggested that participants need to think more before responding to a spatial 
updating task in virtual reality as opposed to real environments; this explains 
larger reaction times in virtual reality point-to-origin tasks (Goeke et al., 2015) as 
compared to physical motion conditions (Riecke et al., 2007). Actually, the 
underlying cognitive processes may even be fundamentally different, since the 
available evidence suggests that the sensorimotor experience of real-world 
navigation cannot be straightforwardly transferred to a virtual setting in which the 
only perceptual information is visual. Since the number of VR studies continues 
to increase, it is essential to gain further insight into the (meta-)cognitive 
processes involved in virtual navigation, and in particular with respect to 
cognitive strategies that are adopted to maintain orientation in virtual space.  
 In this paper, we elicit participants' verbalisations of concepts and 
strategies used to deal with the discrepancy between their actual static situation 
and the imagined navigation in virtual space. Narrowing down the complexity of 
potential issues around virtual navigation, we focus on a point-to-origin task 
performed in desktop VR (tunnel task, see below) that is as neutral and simple as 
possible and should therefore allow for effortless spatial updating during 
navigation. In fact, based on this very assumption, this task has been used 
frequently in spatial cognition research to identify basic cognitive reference 
systems that serve to support orientation in space (following Schönebeck et al., 
2001; see e.g., Goeke et al., 2015). In the following, we briefly review pertinent 
findings on navigation and orientation in virtual and real environments, and the 
role of language in spatial cognition research, before addressing the notion of 
reference systems in more depth. We then introduce the tunnel task paradigm, 
followed by the details of our study. Our aim is to address to what extent the 
cognitive processes involved in virtual navigation are accessible to participants 
and can be externalised via language, as well as changed via language-based 
instruction. Furthermore, we ask how participants understand their own virtual 
navigation in this task, and examine the conscious strategies that they report.  
Navigation and orientation in real and virtual environments  
It has long been established that different types of environment evoke different 
spatial concepts and call for different skills. Based on a large correlational study 
of spatial ability types, Hegarty et al. (2006) identified fundamental limitations 
regarding skill transferability between different scales and task settings. For 
instance, small-scale spatial abilities as identified in paper-and-pencil tasks appear 
to be more directly related to virtual environment based learning than to real-
 world experience. In contrast, self-reported measures correlated more highly with 
real-world experience than with VR based learning. This suggests systematic 
differences between VR and real-world learning that have important implications 
on methodological approaches in spatial cognition. 
Out of the wide variety of aspects that contribute to spatial cognition 
performance in humans and other species, path integration is a well-researched 
fundamental skill needed for spatial orientation (Benhamou & Séguinot, 1995). 
The ability to point back to the starting point of motion, demonstrating successful 
orientation and path integration, can involve at least two distinct cognitive 
mechanisms (Loomis et al., 1999). Continuous updating is quick and automatic 
(Farrell & Robertson, 1998), and suffices for simple motion trajectories. In 
contrast, configural updating requires computation of previous turns, involving a 
higher amount of cognitive effort (May & Klatzky, 2000; Wiener et al., 2011). 
These mechanisms are at work across real-world and virtual navigation scenarios; 
however, performance is only at its best given full availability of sensorimotor 
input (Zetzsche, Galbraith, Wolter, & Schill, 2009). Longer reaction times in 
virtual desktop scenarios (cf. Riecke et al., 2007) appear to suggest a computation 
process going beyond simple continuous updating even with simple motion 
trajectories.  
The lack of decisive sensory feedback in virtual reality navigation studies 
that do not involve physical movement also affects cortical alpha band activity 
(Ehinger et al., 2014). Altogether, it appears highly likely that the reported 
problems with orientation in desktop VR environments are due to the lack of 
idiothetic cues and proprioception. This would suggest that higher complexity and 
sophistication of the VR environment would not necessarily solve these issues. 
For example, the advantages of sensory information do not extend to inertial 
 information (Waller et al., 2003). Also, within desktop presentation modes not 
involving physical movement, Gaunet et al. (2001) found that spatial updating 
was not affected by the mode of presentation at all. Performance in scene 
recognition and estimating the homing direction did not differ between conditions 
using active joystick-based navigation, passive computer-imposed travel, and 
even sequential snapshot-views. Complementarily, Wraga et al. (2004) found that 
spatial updating is consistently more difficult with passive movement or display-
based scene change rather than active physical movement, leading to worse 
performance across various task settings.   
In order to gain a better understanding of the role of orientation in virtual 
reality settings, it is necessary to address individual components that enable 
humans to maintain orientation in space. One crucial aspect concerns the 
environment as such, which supports humans in establishing a spatial reference 
direction as a basis for orientation. In a study set in a sophisticated immersive VR 
environment, Kelly et al. (2008) demonstrated better performance in angular 
(even highly symmetrical) rooms than in circular ones that failed to provide any 
environmental cues at all.  
Establishing a reference direction is not only dependent on environmental 
cues but also on the form in which they are experienced. Reviewing a wide range 
of evidence accumulated in different types of environments (VR and others), 
Montello et al. (2004) found that across settings, spatial knowledge is 
accumulated in an experience-based way; crucially, the experienced orientation 
fundamentally affects spatial performance in subsequent tasks. Moreover, the 
potential for developing extensive survey knowledge based on route experience in 
VR appears to be restricted. Generally, perceptual experience guides how a 
conceptual reference system is established in support of spatial memory (Shelton 
 & McNamara, 2001). Once participants have established a conceptual reference 
frame, they aim to adopt the same concept for subsequent tasks (Kelly & 
McNamara, 2010). 
Correspondingly, different perspectives shown in a virtual environment 
lead to different kinds of cognitive representations (Shelton & McNamara, 2004; 
Török et al., 2014). With an egocentric perspective on the scene, it is easier to 
navigate; with an aerial view, path integration relative to environmental cues is 
easier. Shifts of perspective, such as between egocentric and aerial views, 
negatively affect performance (Shelton & McNamara, 2004). Problems arise in 
particular when the view on the scene is ground-based rather than aerial, yet not 
egocentric, as in a third-person perspective using an avatar with a constantly 
north-oriented map. The mismatch of perceived view and cognitive reference 
system then affects both navigation and orientation (Török et al., 2014). 
However, some of the experience-based orientation cues can be counter-
acted by explicit information about future demands. Mou et al. (2009) showed that 
some of the positive effects of self-locomotion (as discussed above) may be traced 
back to the ability to track the relevant reference direction while moving. 
Participants performed just as well in tasks not involving self-movement when 
they received previous information about the viewing direction to be tested 
subsequently.  
Explicit instruction necessarily involves language, and may potentially 
trigger meta-cognitive considerations about how the task is performed. In the 
following, we briefly discuss the role of language in spatial cognition research.  
 The role of language in spatial cognition research 
As a cognitive skill, language is necessarily involved in spatial cognition research 
in many different respects. Language is used across task settings and disciplines to 
instruct experimental participants, i.e., to explain task procedures. Language can 
be a vehicle for spatial memory, supporting wayfinding and navigation for 
instance through recalling formulations like 'second left' (Meilinger et al., 2008). 
Language can be used as input to accumulate spatial knowledge (Avraamides et 
al., 2013). Language, as a system, has been widely researched to access structures 
of thought, for example with regard to human concepts of space (Talmy, 2000). 
Language can be an external representation of thought and as such is often used as 
data, frequently alongside other measures (Ericsson & Simon, 1993; Gugerty & 
Rodes, 2007; Tenbrink, 2015). Language based spatial descriptions have often 
been used to address how humans conceptualise (and communicate) their 
environment (Allen, 2000; Denis et al., 1999; Taylor & Tversky, 1996).  
Across task settings and goals, research in spatial cognition has drawn 
widely on the close connection between language and thought. The relationship is 
systematic, though not necessarily straightforward, as demonstrated by heated 
debates on various issues (e.g., does language affect spatial reasoning or vice 
versa? Levinson, 2002; Li & Gleitman, 2002). Some aspects appear to be shared 
across linguistic and non-linguistic tasks (Levinson, 2003), while others are 
strikingly dissimilar (Klippel & Montello, 2007). Corresponding to the findings 
on the impact of environmental cues on conceptual orientation and perspective 
described above, Taylor & Tversky (1996) demonstrated that features of the 
environment affect how people describe it verbally. However, they also shifted 
between perspectives in a more flexible way than would be expected based on the 
cognitive costs of conceptual perspective shifts reported above. Tversky, Lee, & 
 Mainwaring (1999) suggest that perspective shifts may be highly task-related. In 
some situations, shifting conceptual perspective and referring to it in language 
may involve less cognitive costs than maintaining the same perspective in spite of 
a changed situation. The next section addresses the relationship between 
conceptual and linguistic reference systems in more detail. 
Reference systems 
Reference systems appear to be essential in human everyday life, although most 
people may never consider the phenomenon consciously, and remain unaware of 
discrepancies between different ways of conceptualising a spatial scene. Language 
offers no grammaticalised distinction between reference systems, and this can 
lead to misunderstandings. Phrases like the hat on the right are ambiguous if the 
addressee adopts a different perspective than the speaker. On the whole, speakers 
have a wide range of options available for producing and interpreting spatial 
descriptions (see Tenbrink, 2011, for a systematic account). Of these options, the 
distinction between speaker and hearer perspective is arguably the most obvious 
(or consciously accessible) one, and it sometimes finds its way into language by 
expressions such as 'from my/your point of view'. 
Generally, reference systems allow positioning locations relative to a body 
(own or others) or relative to other objects or locations, as well as developing 
consistent concepts of extended environments. The literature offers numerous 
accounts of reference systems with diverse, partly contradictory terminologies 
(see Levinson, 2003, for an insightful overview). A binary distinction widely used 
in psychology (O'Keefe & Nadel, 1978), brain sciences (Paillard, 1991), 
philosophy (Kant, 1991 [1768]), and other areas in cognitive science is that 
between allocentric and egocentric reference systems. A conceptualisation of the 
 environment relative to one's own current position is called egocentric, whereas a 
concept independent of the self is allocentric. Many aspects of this distinction still 
remain unresolved, including the precise mapping of conceptual distinctions to 
behavioural performance across tasks as well as to linguistic representations. 
Moreover, theories and findings appear to be in conflict about the underlying 
cognitive mechanisms for spatial updating processes based on reference systems 
(Wang, 2012). 
To our knowledge, systematic and context-independent linguistic markers 
for egocentric and allocentric reference systems consistent with the binary 
distinction as just outlined have not been suggested in the literature. Linguistic 
analysis of reference systems centers on object configuration descriptions (e.g., 
Levinson, 2003; Carlson, 1999) and route descriptions (Couclelis, 1996; Taylor & 
Tversky, 1996). In large-scale environments, a distinction is often made between 
route vs. survey perspective. Here, route can be roughly associated with the 
egocentric reference system because the environment is conceived from the route 
traveller's perspective, and survey with allocentric because the environment is 
conceived from above, independent of the traveller's current perspective (Wang, 
2012). Linguistically, route perspective is associated with expressions such as left 
and right, relating locations to the traveller's current position in the environment, 
while survey is based on compass directions such as north and south, relating 
locations to each other rather than the traveller (Taylor & Tversky, 1996). 
In linguistic analysis in other contexts, a three-fold categorisation proposed 
by Levinson (2003) is now widely adopted. Levinson identified three kinds of 
conceptual reference systems expressed in language: absolute, relative, and 
intrinsic. Absolute reference systems are associated with environmental features 
(uphill, downhill) or compass directions (north, south) on the horizontal plane, 
 and with gravity concerning the vertical dimension. This means that they can 
typically be clearly identified by the linguistic choices. Relative and intrinsic 
reference systems, in contrast, are both expressed by projective terms, i.e., 
expressions that denote a spatial direction such as left, right, front, back, above, 
and below. Relative reference systems are used when an object is described in 
relation to another object from an observer's point of view. Intrinsic reference 
systems rely on an object's or an observer's intrinsic features, such as the speaker's 
own front in The ball is in front of me, or a salient object part, such as The ball is 
in front of the car. Therefore, an incomplete utterance like The ball on the left 
could be used with either type of reference system, adding to the potential 
complications through perspective conflicts. 
Levinson (2003) points out that the binary distinction between allocentric 
and egocentric is neither sufficient to adequately represent the conceptual 
distinctions reflected in language, nor do these two terms map straightforwardly to 
any of the three categories identified by Levinson. For instance, intrinsic reference 
frames are egocentric when the speaker refers to their own intrinsic features, as in 
to my left, but allocentric when the speaker refers to another person's intrinsic 
features, as in to your left. However, survey perspective (as used in large scale 
environments) is conceptually related to the absolute reference system (Taylor & 
Tversky, 1996), while route perspective could be either relative or intrinsic. The 
crucial binary distinction lies in the role of the observer, which is irrelevant in the 
survey case, just as in the notion of an allocentric reference system. Therefore, we 
take the linguistic markers identified for route and survey perspectives as a 
starting point to distinguish egocentric and allocentric reference systems, keeping 
in mind the associated complications as just outlined. This binary reference 
system distinction is crucial to the tunnel task paradigm, which we describe next. 
 The tunnel task paradigm 
The tunnel task was first introduced by Schönebeck et al. (2001), who proposed 
that it triggers two fundamentally distinct ways of conceptualising spatial 
experience in VR. Participants are seated in front of a computer screen and watch 
a journey through a short tunnel. Afterwards the task is to identify the direction of 
the start point. The only information received consists of the translational and 
rotational changes provided by the rate of optic flow during the imaginary journey 
while watching the tunnel (see Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1: Tunnel sequence as observed by participants. Left: beginning of the tunnel 
(straight), middle: traversing tunnel (turn to the right), right: straight end segment of 
the tunnel. 
 
Because there are no reference points during or at the end of the journey, the task 
can only be solved by relying on an internal spatial representation of the tunnel 
(journey). People are often quite consistent and accurate (with respect to angles) 
in their judgment if they receive feedback on numerous training trials. Crucially, 
there are generally two clearly differentiated groups of participants generating 
systematically different results (Goeke et al., 2015; Gramann et al., 2005; Plank et 
al. 2010), with different neurological correlates (Chiu et al., 2012; Gramann et al. 
2009, 2010; Plank et al., 2010). These results are interpreted as consistently 
reflecting two distinct conceptualisations, corresponding to the conceptual spatial 
 reference systems termed egocentric vs. allocentric (Klatzky, 1998) as described 
above. Accordingly this task has frequently been used to distinguish between 
reference system preferences using as little input information as possible (Chiu et 
al., 2012; Goeke et al., 2015; Gramann et al., 2005, 2006, 2009, 2010; Gramann, 
2011; Lin et al., 2009; Planck et al., 2009, 2010; Schönebeck et al., 2001; Seubert 
et al., 2008). According to this interpretation, considering the situation shown in 
Figure 1, an egocentric representation would lead a participant to point to the right 
and back to show the location of the entrance when coming out of the tunnel, 
whereas an allocentric representation would induce pointing to the left and back.  
 According to Gramann (e.g. Gramann et al., 2005), the two strategies are 
related to concepts of turning or not turning one's head or body while imagining 
the travel through the tunnel. The idea is that "turners" follow the virtual path 
through the curving tunnel by mentally adjusting their facial orientation, i.e., they 
imagine turning with the tunnel while navigating. For this reason, their results are 
associated with an egocentric reference system. In contrast, "non-turners" seem 
not to update their heading direction during the imagined rotation of the tunnel; it 
appears that they keep a stable view direction throughout the task as if the tunnel's 
curve did not imply a personal orientation change for them. Accordingly, their 
results are associated with an allocentric reference system, in which they build up 
a mental map of the simulated environment that is independent of their own view 
direction.  
These proposed associations of turning with an egocentric reference 
system and non-turning with an allocentric reference system seem intuitive and 
straightforward. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the distinction of allocentric 
and egocentric reference systems refers to conceptualisations of the real world 
across a wide variety of tasks, while the idea of turning vs. non-turning is highly 
 task-specific for this particular VR scenario. Associating these concepts with each 
other is actually a hypothesis about cognitive mechanisms. In particular, it is 
hypothesised that the cognitive strategies activated by the perceptually sparse 
tunnel task are, at least to some extent, the same as those activated by tasks that 
involve views of decisions in the real world triggered by environmental cues 
(Kelly et al., 2008; Török et al., 2014), verbalisations of internalised 
environmental knowledge, embodied experience, and so on. However, this fairly 
far-reaching hypothesis has so far not been addressed explicitly. To our 
knowledge, independent evidence that participants' tunnel task response patterns 
match different strategies and performance in the real world, validating the 
interpretation in terms of egocentric and allocentric reference systems, has not 
been put forward. 
As such, the interpretation of turning and non-turning in terms of 
egocentric vs. allocentric reference systems is up for debate. As outlined above, 
previous research consistently suggests a profound and lasting effect of the 
experienced perspective (e.g., Kelly & McNamara, 2010; Montello et al., 2004; 
Shelton & McNamara, 2004; Török et al., 2014). The direct navigation experience 
in the tunnel task, i.e., the visual perception of travelling through a tunnel (rather 
than viewing it from above), should therefore have a strong impact on the 
cognitive representation, overruling other possible reference systems that do not 
correspond to the experienced view.  
In fact, alternative explanations have been put forward. Klatzky et al. 
(1998) observed a systematic failure of spatial updating of turn changes in 
situations involving no actual movement, which could only be overcome by 
explicit and systematic instruction (enhancing participants' metacognition). Riecke 
& Wiener (2007) and Riecke (2008) confirmed this finding in a virtual reality task 
 bearing much resemblance to the tunnel task; however, these authors disentangled 
translation and rotation in their task. While the curves of the tunnel task integrate 
both of these, Riecke and Wiener had participants first navigate straight ahead and 
then turn on the spot. The effect of this is that participants who mentally updated 
the view direction ("turners") would point to the left after a rotation to the left. 
However, participants who did not point to the left in such a situation did not, as 
would be expected for "non-turners" (or clearly allocentric) responses, simply 
point back behind them to the starting point following translation. Instead, they 
responded by pointing in the opposite direction (to the right). Hence, Riecke and 
Wiener report this effect as a left-right inversion error. This finding raises further 
doubt concerning the reference system based explanation. This kind of VR 
induced spatial updating error consistently occurs across various task variations, 
to varying degrees (Riecke, Cunningham, & Bülthoff, 2007; Riecke, Sigurdarson, 
& Milne, 2012). However, participants' underlying conception of the task, the 
nature of the challenge posed by spatial updating, and the cognitive strategies for 
dealing with them have not been directly addressed. 
  Since research on orientation in virtual settings has thus opened up a 
number of issues related to basal vs. metacognitive processing, the tunnel task 
paradigm provides an ideal setting to address our concerns about the role of 
cognitive strategies in maintaining orientation in virtual navigation. The paradigm 
has been used as an indicator for the results of cognitive processes, presupposing 
(rather than addressing) the actual cognitive mechanisms and strategies that are 
employed when solving this task. To some extent, neglecting the cognitive 
processes involved makes sense because the conceptual reference systems used to 
solve this task are expected to be unconscious, and, accordingly, not directly 
accessible to analysis. However, this does not preclude participants from 
 developing conscious navigation or task solution strategies – and these may or 
may not be associated with generic types of reference systems. Moreover, since 
people can be instructed and trained to successfully adopt the strategy opposing 
their own intuitive concepts (Gramann et al., 2005), the underlying 
conceptualisations can apparently be manipulated by conscious (verbalised) 
decision. In fact, the extent to which reference system preferences are basal, 
unconscious, and inaccessible to metacognitive consideration is not known to 
date. Recent evidence (Münzer & Hölscher, 2011) indicates that people can tell 
reliably what they actually do and how successful they are in wayfinding and 
spatial orientation. This is based on preferences that are systematically related to 
egocentric vs. allocentric perspectives, though these, as such, may remain 
inaccessible to conscious reflection. Moreover, numerous studies show that 
reference systems are consistently (though not explicitly) expressed in language 
and can therefore be derived from how descriptions are formulated, even though 
potential ambiguity may complicate the analysis and necessitate a direct 
comparison with the observed scene (Carlson, 1999; Carlson-Radvansky & 
Logan, 1997; Taylor & Tversky, 1996; Tenbrink, Coventry, & Andonova, 2011). 
Therefore, systematic features of the language used to describe reference system 
based behaviour should be indicative of the underlying concepts, even if the 
speakers are unable to produce (or do not volunteer) an explicit description of the 
conceptual reference system they used. 
Our present study was designed to investigate the participants' verbalised 
methods to solve a virtual navigation task in which spatial decisions needed to be 
made, based on as little perceptual information as possible. We asked to what 
extent the underlying reference systems are verbalisable as well as accessible to 
conscious manipulation via explicit instruction, and to what extent participants' 
 verbalisations exhibit linguistic features and patterns paralleling those that have 
previously been found for reference systems in language (Taylor & Tversky, 
1996; Tenbrink, 2007, 2011). If participants' preferences in the tunnel task reflect 
the same underlying allocentric and egocentric reference systems as used to 
conceptualise the real world, the verbalisations should resemble those that have 
repeatedly been found for other types of verbalisations of different reference 
system concepts. Moreover, if participants' preferences reflect their generic (i.e., 
task-independent) preferences for a particular type of reference system, their 
verbalisations should reflect a change of conceptualisation when asked to change 
consciously towards a non-preferred strategy. Following Gramann et al. (2005), 
we predicted that such a change is actually possible based on explicit verbal 
instruction that enhances metacognitive consideration of the activation of a 
particular reference system. In a nutshell, the following hypotheses emerge: 
H1. Verbalisability. Based on the literature on reference systems, 
orientation, and language as a representation of spatial concepts, we 
expect that participants will find ways of describing cognitive strategies 
in spite of the scarcity of perceptual input. 
a. If the concepts triggered by the tunnel task correspond to reference 
systems used in more complex situations (in real world or VR 
settings), verbalisations will clearly relate to previously identified 
verbalisations of allocentric or egocentric navigation.  
b. Alternatively, if the tunnel task triggers different types of concepts or 
strategies other than the two basic reference systems, the 
verbalisations will differ in nature from these known patterns of 
linguistic reference system indicators. 
 H2. Individual differences. Previous research using the tunnel task has 
shown that participants provide two clearly distinct kinds of 
behavioural responses, which we accordingly expect to be the case in 
our study.  
a. To the extent that their concepts and strategies are verbalisable, 
verbalisations should exhibit distinct patterns as well, corresponding 
to consistently different ways of referring to conceptually distinct 
reference systems or strategies. 
b. If the tunnel task triggers basic reference systems, these patterns will 
correspond to previously identified linguistic patterns for allocentric 
and egocentric spatial reference systems. Allocentric verbalisations 
will be produced along with allocentric behavioural results, and 
egocentric verbalisations with egocentric behavioural results. 
c. If the tunnel task triggers other kinds of cognitive strategies, the 
verbalisation patterns will not correspond to the basal reference 
systems, but may reveal participants' understanding and awareness 
of their experience in other ways. 
H3. Conceptual flexibility. Following Gramann (2005), speakers can be 
made aware of different ways of conceptualising the tunnel task.  
a. If the tunnel task triggers reference systems, behavioural patterns 
will emerge as instructed, and the ensuing verbalisations will exhibit 
distinct patterns, as before. This is in line with previous work 
showing that humans are able to switch between reference systems 
and use them differentially in language (Levinson et al., 2002; 
Taylor & Tversky, 1996). 
 b. If the tunnel task triggers other kinds of cognitive strategies, 
behavioural and linguistic patterns may not correspond to the 
instruction conditions systematically.  
Empirical study  
Our version of the tunnel task was modelled on the pre-test and Experiment 2 
described in Gramann et al. (2005), with three major differences.  
First, we collected verbal data to address how participants would represent 
reference systems and cognitive strategies in language, building on principles of 
Cognitive Discourse Analysis (Tenbrink, 2015). For this purpose we had 
participants think aloud (Ericsson & Simon, 1993) while travelling through the 
virtual tunnels and indicating the homing direction (i.e. pointing back to the origin 
of travel); additionally we elicited retrospective verbal reports about their thought 
processes after each block of tasks.  
Secondly, we speculated that participants might have difficulties 
interpreting the simulated 3D arrows that were shown at the end of each tunnel to 
indicate the possible position of the entrance. We reasoned that this method of 
eliciting direction judgments could be confusing because the arrows were, like the 
tunnel, only shown on the computer screen. They simulated a direction 
perpendicular to the actual two-dimensional plane on which the arrows were 
shown (see Figure 2). We wished to rule out the possibility that people’s differing 
answers were the result of different interpretations of quasi-3D arrows on a 2D 
screen, rather than reflecting different reference systems or conceptualisations of 
the tunnel journey. Therefore we introduced a condition in which participants did 
not see the arrows; instead the screen remained black, and participants were asked 
 to indicate the position of the tunnel entrance by pointing back over their 
shoulders.  
 
 
Figure 2: Two three-dimensional answer arrows displayed after a tunnel disappears 
(arrow condition). In the pointing condition the screen appeared just black without 
arrows. 
 
Apart from avoiding potential confusions, actual pointing in a real world 
direction might also serve to raise awareness of the simulated embodiment 
involved in this task, and thus support the participants' metacognitive 
consideration of the simulated navigation. This idea is related to findings showing 
that physical performance (e.g. walking or turning) of simulated actions improves 
performance in VR tasks (Klatzky et al., 1998). Additionally however, physical 
pointing may provide an additional cue that could enhance the salience of one or 
another reference frame, for instance by reinforcing the egocentric perspective. 
Therefore, and in order to be able to compare our results to previous work in the 
literature using the tunnel task paradigm with arrows, we used both conditions in a 
between-participants design. We predicted that results should not systematically 
differ between the arrow and pointing conditions, but individuals might possibly 
become more consistent in their judgments because they were supported by 
 embodiment. If there was a bias towards one type of response, we expected it to 
correspond to the egocentric reference system. 
Thirdly, to test if participants were flexible enough to employ a non-
preferred strategy, Gramann et al. (2005: Experiment 2) instructed their 
participants explicitly that there were two ways of solving this task, and that they 
should use the one they hadn't used before. They gave feedback to participants 
and let them practise until they were comfortable with the non-preferred strategy. 
This procedure opens up various avenues for solving this task in a more conscious 
manner. On the one hand, participants may activate a metacognitive level, i.e., 
become aware of the two different reference systems and make an effort to 
conceptualise the scene in a different way. On the other hand, once the 
participants were informed that there are two correct possibilities, and that they 
were now supposed to adopt the alternative solution to the one they had 
consistently taken so far, they could use a strategic logical approach. It was 
possible to conform to the experimenter's expectation by projecting the preferred 
solution to the opposite side, i.e. the second previously not chosen arrow. 
Participants trying to be cooperative may not perceive this strategy as cheating, 
because they may intellectually grasp the verbal instructions, and yet they still 
might not genuinely adapt to the new way of conceptualising the tunnel task. 
Since we were interested in the extent to which participants could be made aware 
of different underlying reference systems based on verbal instruction only, we 
neither provided feedback nor allowed for additional practice trials, nor did we 
specify the relation of our instruction to the participants' performances on 
previous sessions. Specifically, we neither told them that they should now use the 
opposite strategy, nor that they should continue using their previous one. Instead, 
 we simply informed participants that there were several ways of solving this task, 
and that they were now asked to solve it in a particular way.  
Method 
45 native English speakers (32 females, 13 males; mean age 22 years, median: 21 
years, age range: 19-33 years) participated in the study for compensation of 
expenses. They had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were undergraduate, 
graduate, or postdoctoral students of Psychology at Cambridge University (UK). 
The tests and their accompanying explanations were organised in a single 
computer program to control information about the trials across all participants. 
The experimenter was not present in the room for the duration of the trials. 
Participants were asked to think aloud during task completion, and they were 
subsequently interrogated about their cognitive processes.  
The participants’ task was to keep alert during the passage through 20 
simulated tunnels so as to be able to determine the starting point afterwards. The 
participants started the task by pressing one of the mouse buttons. An asterisk 
would then appear for 0.5 seconds and then tunnel movement would commence. 
Once the path was traversed the tunnel movement ended with the display of the 
last frame for 0.5 seconds. The participants' response was elicited, and the next 
trial started after a short interval. No feedback was given about their choice.  
The tunnel length was kept constant. Each tunnel started and ended with a 
straight segment, but the curves differed with respect to direction (left or right) as 
well as angle. Participants were given 3 blocks of tunnels, with three different 
instructions as described below. The blocks always used the same set of 20 
tunnels, presented in different order across the three blocks of tunnels. Each block 
consisted of 17 tunnels with just one curve varying between angles of 10 and 90 
 degrees in either direction, and 3 distractor tunnels that had two curves. Only 
tunnels with one curve were used for analysis because we did not have any 
particular hypotheses concerning more complex navigation scenarios, and 
therefore wished to keep the situation as basic and simple as possible.  
For the purposes of providing a response, they were given either one of the 
following options, depending on condition. Participants were allocated randomly 
to these two conditions. 
In the arrow condition, an asterisk was presented for one second, followed 
by two three-dimensional response arrows. By clicking on the corresponding 
mouse button participants chose the arrow that indicated the direction of the 
tunnel entrance relative to the end position. 
In the pointing condition, they were asked to respond by pointing "back 
over your shoulder to where the starting point of the tunnel (the tunnel entrance) 
should be, in a straight line (as the crow flies)." 
Altogether this yields a 2 (arrow vs. pointing) * 3 (instructions for tunnel 
blocks) design, with the former pertaining to our goal of ruling out an alternative 
explanation of the results (misinterpretation of arrows), and the latter directly 
addressing our third main hypothesis (H3: Conceptual flexibility). Our first two 
main hypotheses did not feed into the experimental conditions because the first 
(H1: Verbalisability) is qualitative, and the second (H2: Individual differences) 
pertains to different behavioural responses to the same stimulus.    
Procedure 
After a short briefing, participants were trained in the typically unfamiliar task of 
thinking aloud, following the procedural suggestions by Ericsson & Simon 
(1993). Then they were seated in an unlit, windowless testing room in front of a 
 16” computer monitor that was surrounded by black cardboard to eliminate 
additional reference information, and provided with a written instruction (see 
Appendix 1) that explained the tunnel task in detail, modelled on the instruction 
given by Gramann et al. (2005). They were shown an example tunnel for 
demonstration and asked to read the instruction again. After two practice trials, 
the experimenter reminded the participant to think aloud constantly, and left the 
room for the duration of the first phase consisting of 20 trial tunnels.  
When the participant indicated that they were done with the tunnels, the 
experimenter returned and asked the following retrospective question: "Please 
describe to me in a few sentences what you think was happening and how you 
made your decision at the end of each tunnel journey." Next, participants were 
asked to fill out a questionnaire consisting of 13 or 15 (depending on condition) 
closed (yes/no) questions addressing various ways of conceptualising the tunnel 
task (see Appendix 2). These questions were motivated from verbal reports 
collected in a series of pilot studies1 as well as from theoretical considerations 
(see Appendix 2). Subsequently, phase 2 commenced with a verbal instruction 
(again modelled from Gramann et al., 2005) intended to trigger either an 
allocentric or an egocentric representation (in balanced order across participants). 
The egocentric version was as follows, henceforth referred to as bike instruction:   
 
"There is more than one way of solving this task, as you may have realised from 
the questionnaire. No matter how you did it so far, you are now asked to do the 
tunnel task again, but this time you are asked to conceive of it in a particular way.  
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Experimental Psychology, University of Cambridge, UK. 
 Please imagine that you are driving a bike, leaning yourself into the turns of the 
tunnel.  
Again, while you solve this task, please talk aloud constantly, saying anything that 
comes to your mind."   
 
The allocentric version (henceforth referred to as ball instruction) was identical 
except that the bike-related sentence was replaced by the following sentence: 
 
"Please imagine that you are looking down on the tunnel from above, watching a 
ball roll through it." 
 
All participants received both of these instructions, either for phase 2 or for phase 
3. The order was balanced. These phases were carried out in the same way as the 
neutral phase 1, with the exception of the questionnaire, which was not 
administered again. After having answered the retrospective question in phase 3, 
participants were asked a few demographic questions, debriefed, and paid.  
Analysis 
To address our three main research hypotheses (H1: verbalisability, H2: 
individual differences, H3: conceptual flexibility) along with the more general 
question of how participants conceptualise the tunnel task, we focused on three 
types of evidence that provide diverse perspectives on the cognitive processes 
involved: behavioural data, elicited verbalisations, and questionnaire responses. 
According to previous literature as outlined above participants systematically 
diverge in their use of either one of the two available solution strategies, as well as 
with respect to developing a consistent strategy at all. With this solid empirical 
 background there was no reason to include a control group without language 
elicitation in our fairly time-intensive study. The issue of possible effects of this 
design will be taken up critically in the Discussion section.  
Behavioural analysis 
1. To prepare addressing H2 (individual differences) and H3 (conceptual 
flexibility), based on the neutral condition we allocated participants to 
behavioural preference groups, based on their preference for behavioural 
responses at a threshold of 80% (compare the 70% threshold in Gramann 
et al., 2005). Participants were allocated to the "egocentric" group if at 
least 14 of their 17 responses corresponded to the predictions for an 
egocentric conceptualisation (according to the literature using the tunnel 
task), and to the "allocentric" group if at least 14 responses corresponded 
to the predictions for an allocentric conceptualisation. Participants with 
less consistent responses were allocated to a third group called "no 
preference".  
2. To address our concern that the conventional arrow representation might 
be interpreted in different ways as it involves translation of the current 
spatial experience to a two-dimensional direction on the screen, we 
compared the behavioural results (directional responses) in our three 
instruction conditions (neutral, bike, ball) for "arrow" vs. "pointing" 
responses. 
3. To address H3 (conceptual flexibility) we compared the behavioural 
results of the three conditions (neutral, bike, ball). As part of this we 
performed additional analyses of response times and gender (not central to 
our research goals), which are provided in Appendix 3. 
 Linguistic analysis 
To address all three hypotheses H1, H2, and H3 with their specifications as 
detailed above, we transcribed the think-aloud data collected during virtual tunnel 
navigation as well as the retrospective reports, and identified occurrences of the 
following linguistic indicators. While the actual set of linguistic items chosen was 
based on the nature of our data through post-hoc examination, the majority (all 
except map and compass) had been previously identified as reflecting underlying 
reference systems (e.g., Taylor & Tversky, 1996; Tenbrink, 2007; Wang, 2012). 
Using these in our analysis allowed us to distinguish between H1a and H1b: 
- survey (arguably corresponding to allocentric) representation: north, south, 
east, west, map, compass, (from) above 
- route (arguably corresponding to egocentric) representation: left, right, front, 
straight, forward, back 
The relative frequency of indicators for both categories, as well as the number of 
participants mentioning any indicators of a category at all, was assessed as 
follows. Results were assessed separately for the preference groups (egocentric, 
allocentric, no preference) established post-hoc in the first step of the behavioural 
analysis as described above, allowing us to address H2a and distinguish between 
H2b and H2c, as well as for the complete data set in all three instruction tasks 
(neutral, ball, and bike) so as to distinguish between H3a and H3b. 
According to H2b, participants preferring allocentric solutions should 
employ more survey indicators than those using egocentric solutions if the 
concepts triggered by the tunnel task correspond to reference systems known from 
other contexts. Likewise, according to H3a, participants should provide more 
survey indicators in the ball (allocentric instruction) condition than in the bike 
(egocentric instruction) condition. For route indicators, the opposite may be true. 
 The alternatives, H1b, H2c, and H3b, allow for the possibility that verbalisations 
may not correspond to these patterns, and so we approached the data with an open 
mind with respect to the types of linguistic indicators we might find. 
Moreover, it stands to reason that, in this particular scenario, people might 
frequently use the terms left and right independently of the reference system used, 
simply because the tunnel curved to the left or right (as seen from above just as 
well as as seen from within the tunnel). In more general terms, the distinction 
between route-related projective (left/right, etc.) and survey-related expressions, 
which are typically associated with expressions for compass directions, may not 
be suitable at all for this particular structure-less scenario. In this sense, the 
systematic linguistic distinctions between reference systems as highlighted in the 
literature may be of limited scope. Ultimately, the literature to date does not 
provide a sufficient basis for predicting how the two conceptual representations 
triggered by the tunnel task may be represented linguistically.  
For these reasons, we extended our linguistic analysis beyond the 
quantitative analysis of linguistic indicators of reference systems. To gain further 
insights from participants' verbalisations, we searched the think-aloud data and 
retrospective reports for verbalised ideas and strategies that might shed light on 
the participants' thought processes. The results of this qualitative analysis will be 
presented in terms of case studies, where the verbalisations along with the 
associated questionnaire results serve to explain the individuals' behavioural 
results. This will shed light on the range of variability in participants' concepts, 
which to some extent accounts for the limitations of a purely quantitative 
approach in this context.  
 Questionnaire analysis 
We were interested in the relationship between participants' behavioural results 
and retrospective rationalisations that might reflect various ways of 
conceptualising the task. For this purpose, we administered a questionnaire (see 
Appendix 2) with 13-15 questions (depending on condition) requesting yes/no 
answers. 10 of these were designed for specific quantifiable purposes as follows, 
while the remaining questions were designed to provide further background 
information. The first two (see table 1 below) questioned the VR experience 
created by a minimalistic and simplistic visual input while simultaneously 
excluding any other senses (e.g. propriosensoric), by asking if the participants 
actually experienced themselves as moving through the tunnel (as they were 
expected to). Questions 9 and 10 addressed the possibility of turning (re-orienting) 
back after emerging from the tunnel. These four questions were confirmatory in 
nature. 
 Table 1: Questionnaire answers predicted from participants with allocentric 
and egocentric preferences (see Appendix 2 for the complete questionnaire). 
The first four questions in this table (no. 1, 2, 9, 10 in the questionnaire) were 
confirmatory in nature and addressed the participants' general 
conceptualisation of the task, independent of behavioural preference or 
underlying reference system. 
 Answers expected 
from an allocentric 
perspective 
Answers expected 
from an egocentric 
perspective 
(1) moving through tunnel yes yes 
(2) tunnel moving past me no no 
(9) keep orientation constant  yes yes 
(10) turn to look at direction  no no 
(3) re-orienting head no yes 
(4) re-orienting body no yes 
(5) changing direction no yes 
(6) looking straight  yes no 
(7) lean body no yes 
(8) bird's eye view  yes no 
 
Questions 3 to 8 tested participants’ answers for allo- or egocentric 
preferences, and were therefore quantified for further analysis. We had clear 
predictions for these questions based on previous findings in the literature as 
outlined above. Any answer in accordance with these predictions was rewarded 
with 1 point, while any deviation received -1. Consequently participants could 
achieve a maximum value of 6 if they always responded in accordance with 
 expectations, and a minimum of -6 if they always gave the opposite answer than 
expected.  
Since the data collected in this way are discontinuous, i.e. only discrete 
integers are possible, they were analysed using nonparametric test statistics 
(Kruskal Wallis test for the three-group comparison, and Mann-Whitney-U test 
for comparing two groups). 
Results 
The analysis is based on a set of 45 participants. 22 of these provided their 
directional answers by pointing over their shoulder (pointing condition); the 
others clicked on one out of two arrows (arrow condition).  
Behavioural results 
Behavioural preference groups. In the neutral phase 1, most (34 of the 
45) participants provided consistent answers that corresponded to the expectations 
of an underlying preference for either an egocentric (N=22) or an allocentric 
(N=12) reference system. For convenience these will in the following be called 
'allo' and 'ego' groups, respectively, bearing in mind that this does not necessarily 
imply that these response patterns were actually based on such a reference system. 
Eleven participants did not show a clear preference and will therefore be referred 
to as the ‘no preference’ group. 
Comparison of ‘arrow’ and ‘pointing’ conditions. Under both 
conditions -‘arrow’ and ‘pointing’ –  a similar number of participants (see Figure 
3) consistently used an allocentric or egocentric reference system, or remained 
without preference. Therefore Fisher's exact test could not detect any significant 
 difference between the ‘arrow’ and ‘pointing’ conditions, and we combined data 
from both conditions (‘arrow’ and ‘pointing’) to one dataset for further analysis. 
 
 
Figure 3: Number of participants with preferences for “egocentric” or 
“allocentric” or no clear response pattern in the arrow and pointing conditions.2  
 
Influence of instruction on behavioural preferences. Addressing H3 
(conceptual flexibility), the instructions in the bike and ball conditions were 
formulated to trigger a shift in the dominance of preferences. The bike condition 
provided instructions for an egocentric reference system, while the instructions in 
the ball condition favoured a conceptualisation based on an allocentric reference 
system. Surprisingly, results revealed little change in individuals' responses for 
those who had developed a clear preference during the neutral condition. 
However, in both the 'arrow' and 'pointing' conditions, the number of people 
without a consistent preference decreased over the course of the three sessions 
(see Table 2); in this respect, the "no preference” group differed significantly 
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 (Fisher's Exact Test, p = 0.0013) from the other two groups. The majority (82%) 
of the participants who did not show a clear preference during the neutral phase 
developed a preference and favoured either egocentric (6 participants) or 
allocentric (3 participants) solutions. Two of the latter developed this preference 
only in the ball condition (consistent with the instruction), while the seven others 
kept their preference constant independent of instruction. Only two people 
remained without a clear preference. 
 
Table 2: Number of participants with allocentric, egocentric, or no preference 
during the neutral phase who showed the same preference during all conditions 
(constant) or changed their preference (change). *: Fisher's Exact Test (p = 
0.0013) 
 constant change Total 
Allocentric 10 2 12 
Egocentric      17 5 22 
No preference              2* 9* 11* 
 
Two participants with an allocentric preference lost their preference in one of the 
conditions. One of them had no preference in the bike condition and the other had 
none in the ball condition. 
Five participants with an egocentric reference system changed their 
preference. Four of them failed to show a preference either during the ball 
condition, the bike condition, or in both. Only one participant switched her 
preference according to the instructions from egocentric to allocentric in the ball 
condition.  
 In sum, only 35,6 % of all participants were influenced by the instructions 
and consequently changed their preference. However, there is no indication that 
the instructions shifted the responses of the participants in a predictable (such as 
the intended) direction. This unexpected result could not be due to a lack of 
statistical power, i.e., our data showed no tendency for the response patterns to 
shift according to the instructions that might emerge more clearly with a higher 
number of participants. 
Quantitative linguistic results 
To address all three of our hypotheses along with their specifications as detailed 
above, we investigated the use and distribution of route and survey perspective 
markers in the linguistic data. We found a strikingly consistent preference for 
route perspective indicators in the linguistic data. Across all data we only 
collected 43 instances of survey-type linguistic markers produced by 45 
participants, i.e., less than one per speaker on average. This casts doubt on the 
association of tunnel task responses with generic reference system types (to be 
discussed below). Nevertheless, their distribution across conditions and 
behavioural preferences shows some interesting tendencies. Participants in the 
'allo' response group used slightly more survey perspective indicators. There was 
also a tendency towards survey-type verbalisations following instruction in the 
ball condition, but not in the bike condition (corresponding to the predictions 
according to reference systems).  
With the neutral instruction in phase 1, only 26.67% of the 45 participants 
used survey indicators at all throughout the verbalisations. 41.67% of the 12 
participants in the 'allo' group used survey indicators, and 22.73% of the 22 'ego' 
participants used survey indicators. In contrast, all participants used route 
 indicators frequently throughout their verbalisations, rendering this aspect 
unsuitable as an indicator for differentiated cognitive processes in this setting. 
Altogether, 98.85% of all identified linguistic indicators in the neutral condition 
were route perspective indicators; i.e., only 1.15% fell into the survey category 
(N=43). Of these, allocentric behaviour was associated with 2.65% linguistic 
survey indicators, egocentric behaviour with 0.44%, and inconsistent behaviour 
with 0.80% (see Figure 4). A t-test revealed a marginally significant difference 
between the preference groups with respect to the frequency of use of survey 
indicators in the neutral condition (T=1.989; df=32; p=0.055), but not with respect 
to the use of route indicators (T=0.369; df=32; p=0.715).  
 
Figure 4: Distribution of linguistic survey indicators across participants according 
to their behavioural preference ('allo', 'ego', or 'no preference'). The top line shows 
 whether they used survey indicators at all, and the lower line their percentage of 
all markers used (i.e., relative to route indicators). 
 
With the bike (egocentric) instruction there were 1.03% survey indicators, 
and with the ball (allocentric) instruction 2.73%. The use of survey indicators was 
highly correlated across conditions (p<0.001). It differed significantly between the 
neutral and ball conditions (T=2.107; df=42; p<0.05) and between the bike and 
ball conditions (T= -2.936; df=41; p<0.01), but not between the neutral and bike 
conditions (T=-0.852; df=42; p=0.399). Altogether, it seems fair to say that 
linguistic indicators of survey perspective may reflect behaviour to a limited 
extent. Nevertheless this is not a prominent feature of the think-aloud protocols, 
since the number of such terms used spontaneously is so low. Therefore it is 
necessary to take a closer look at what participants actually say, as we will do in 
the qualitative analysis below. 
Questionnaire results 
In the four questions that were asked to probe the participants' general 
conceptualisation of the task independent of the underlying reference system, the 
three groups ('allo', 'ego', no preference) did not differ in their responses (Kruskal-
Wallis Test, df=2, H= 2.622, p=0.269). This indicates that participants mostly 
followed the instructions as intended, or at least believed they had done so. 
Questions 3-8 explored the participants' conceptualisations with respect to 
reference systems, addressing the concepts employed explicitly in the ball and 
bike instructions (which followed the questionnaire). Participants in the 'allo' 
group responded in ways consistent with our predictions significantly more often 
than did participants in the 'ego' group (Mann-Whitney U Test, U= 211.000, r = 
 10.480, p= 0.001). The 'ego' group had a tendency to answer contrary to 
predictions; the results of about 80% of the participants in this group equaled or 
were below 0 (Figure 5). In contrast, this was only the case for 25% of 
participants in the 'allo' group. Judging from these results, it appears that while the 
12 participants in the 'allo' group might have had a (reasonably) clear 
conceptualisation of an allocentric reference system and kept it stable, this was 
not case for the 22 participants in the 'ego' group.  
 
Figure 5: Questionnaire analysis for 12 participants categorised based on their 
behavioural preference as 'allo' (x-axis: 1 – 12) and 22 categorised as 'ego' (13 – 
34). Each symbol represents a participant. Any answer in accordance with 
predictions was rewarded with 1 point, while any deviation received -1 (see 
Methods). Consequently participants could achieve a maximum value of 6 (on the 
y-axis) if they always responded in accordance with expectations, and a minimum 
of -6 if they always gave the opposite answer than expected. The distribution 
shows that the 'allo' participants responded mostly according to predictions 
(nearly all dots are above the 0 line), while the 'ego' participants did not. 
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Case studies 
Since the questionnaire results were inconclusive and the quantitative linguistic 
analysis revealed only marginal informativity of linguistic indicators such as those 
known from the literature, we were interested in comprehending in more detail 
how individual participants might have understood this task. In the following, we 
present different cases of metacognitive considerations exhibited in verbalisation. 
We begin by discussing two clear cases of consistent egocentric or allocentric 
conceptualisations before turning to more surprising (and therefore illuminating) 
cases. 
 
1) Consistent egocentric representation 
The behavioural results of participant no. 12 are consistently egocentric across all 
three conditions, independent of the explicit instruction given. The think-aloud 
data are fairly repetitive in the neutral condition, with some variations to the 
format of "going straight, sharp curve off to the left, um and then straight again, so 
back – to my left." Astonishingly, the participant retrospectively reports "I was 
just kind of imagining where I was from above really", which points to an 
allocentric representation (contrary to the behavioural results). However, when 
given this same question explicitly in the questionnaire, the answer is NO, 
reflecting an inconsistency or lack of awareness of the employed conceptual 
perspective. In the bike task the participant frequently mentions leaning into the 
curves as requested, and subsequently reports "I was – imagining it more from 
being in the tunnel – um – this time". In the ball task, the participant in effect 
takes the ball's "perspective", as evidenced by repeated utterances such as "so the 
 ball's now rolling straight, starting to turn right, um he's curved to the right, and 
he's now going straight, so it's – uh behind him to the right." Here, both the 
personal pronoun "he" and the concept of localising the entrance "behind" the ball 
(which should not possess an intrinsic back side) suggest a personification rather 
than an allocentric perspective. In the associated retrospective report the 
participant says, "I found that one a bit harder to imagine sort of being from above 
just 'cause - you - you know, you're going straight down the tunnel" – reflecting 
on the discrepancy between the perceptual input shown on the screen, and the 
suggested notion of viewing the scene from above. In all three conditions, there 
are a few linguistic survey indicators (two, one, and three, respectively, in the 
neutral, bike, and ball condition). Altogether, this candidate appears like a 
prototypical participant exhibiting a strong egocentric reference system 
preference, with little metacognition of the underlying concepts and processes. 
The initial retrospective report and a higher than average use of survey indicators 
deviate from the egocentric pattern.  
 
2) Consistent allocentric representation 
Participant no. 51 starts out in the first few trials of the tunnel task, in the neutral 
phase, by verbalising egocentric representations such as "so we're going round to 
the right which means that the tunnel entrance should be over my right shoulder 
still". With the third trial, the concepts appear to shift, and the participant mutters 
a few almost inaudible remarks sounding like "let me think about it... how do I 
know". After this, she starts thinking aloud as follows: "we went left, so we want 
to go back to southeast". Such reflections of clear allocentric thinking were then 
continued throughout the trials during the neutral phase. The behavioural data 
show two egocentric trials followed by almost consistently allocentric responses 
 (with an extremely long reaction time in trial 3, corresponding to the conceptual 
shift), with one further exception in trial 7 (another egocentric response) where 
the participant's think-aloud data reflect confusion ("hmm, what is that?").  
 The retrospective report reflects no conscious recollection of this 
conceptual shift; instead, the participant simply reports, "I was thinking about in 
terms of a compass how you get back". Taken together, the think-aloud data and 
the retrospective report of the neutral phase contain 15 indicators of survey 
perspective, and 69 indicators of route perspective, yielding a percentage of 
17.86% survey indicators. 
Altogether in this neutral phase, this participants' verbalisations were 
precisely as expected for participants using the allocentric perspective, with the 
additional feature of a conceptual reorientation after the first two trials. 
Surprisingly however, in the questionnaire she reports reorienting both head and 
body during the tunnel journeys, but negates conceptualising the scene from a 
bird's eye view.  
The explicit instructions did not affect this participant's concepts. The 
behavioural results remained consistently allocentric with both bike and ball 
instructions, the think-aloud data and the retrospective reports reflected survey 
perspective as before, and the percentage of survey indicators remained high 
(26.76% in the bike condition and 27.16% in the ball condition). The retrospective 
reports reflect a conscious preference for the ball instruction as might be expected 
for a person with an allocentric preference.  
Altogether, this consistently allocentric representation appears to mirror 
the egocentric version in the previous case in that responses remain consistent and 
unaffected by instructions, and in that there are some discrepancies with respect to 
the verbalisability of underlying concepts, in accord with the assumption of 
 mainly unconscious processes. It could be expected that most people showing 
allocentric preferences would act and verbalise in similar ways.  However, 
notably this person is the only one in our data set whose verbalisations reflected 
an allocentric perspective in a clearly identifiable and consistent manner. This fact 
is reflected in the percentage of linguistic survey indicators, which were about ten 
times higher for this person than the average (see section Quantitative Linguistic 
Results above). In the following we look more closely at two other participants 
with consistent behavioural allocentric preferences to see how these people 
verbalise this. 
 
3) Logic calculation based on allocentric reference system 
When asked about their use of logic rather than sense of direction in the 
questionnaire, only six participants responded in the negative, in spite of the fact 
that only six (different) participants negated using their sense of direction each 
time. Thus, people did not regard this as a contradiction, but combined their 
logical thinking (arguably a conscious effort) with their sense of direction 
(arguably a more unconscious process). Here we look more closely at one 
participant for whom logic appeared to play a major role.  
The think-aloud data produced by participant no. 4 in the neutral condition 
contain frequent markers of causal relations such as so, as in "I'm going straight 
ahead again, then we're turning - to the left, that was a significant turn (...) so I'm 
gonna point more - to the right than the last time behind me." Either so or 
therefore appeared almost every time before indicating the start direction (in a 
consistently allocentric manner), sometimes reinforced by "so I'm just going to 
say it's...". In retrospect, this participant reports "basically if - if we went along 
and then turned to the right on the tunnel, I knew that the point of entrance was to 
 the left, so that - that was basically how I made my decision". Following the bike 
instruction the think-aloud data reflect the participant's efforts to imagine the 
situation as requested, as in "now this seems like quite a sharp, oh yes very sharp - 
I'm about to fall off my bike". Corresponding to the unaltered allocentric 
behavioural results, the participant reports in retrospect, "so I made the decision 
on exactly the same grounds, the only difference was this time I tried to move my 
body as if I was on the bike".  
Following the ball instruction, the think-aloud data reflect confusion in 
spite of the participant's clear preference for the corresponding perspective: "what 
I'm trying to do now is not think about left and right and just visualise a ball, so to 
do it somewhat more intuitively, which in a way requires a lot more concentration 
and it isn't such that I can justify my answer". The causal markers become less 
frequent; a typical utterance before indicating the homing direction now is "I think 
that's over there". The final retrospective report after finishing the trials in the ball 
condition is revealing with respect to the relative roles of metacognition, intuitive 
conceptualisations, and logic in this situation: "whether I was a person or a bike or 
a ball I think I wasn't actually using the same way of doing it, so I was trying to 
think well what's another way of doing it. So I tried not to do the left right kind of 
calculating mode of thought and just to imagine it leaving a trace, a visual trace. 
Um, so – a more kind of intuitive thing. I did that for a while and then I found 
myself going back to the left right calculating thing". Nevertheless, this 
participant consistently produced allocentric responses throughout, except for one 
egocentric response in each of the neutral and bike conditions and two exceptions 
in the ball condition. Thus, in this case the metacognitive verbalisations revealed 
some awareness of the way in which responses were given (based on logic), but 
 no flexibility towards changing these concepts using a different kind of reference 
system.  
 
4) Turning back and dropping pennies 
Coming out of the tunnel, participant no. 71 apparently adopted a different kind of 
logic as compared to the previous example, namely a logic of turning back, as in 
the following think-aloud statements which are typical for this participant's 
utterances before making a decision: "it's reached the end of the tunnel, and 
because it went right, um, to go backwards you'd have to go left, so that's why I 
think it's the one on the left", and "because the tunnel turned right – um, to back 
on itself, um - you'd have to turn left, so that's why I think it's the left one." In the 
retrospective report, this participant says "I imagined a map in my head of - of 
what it - what the journey would look like", which corresponds to our 
expectations for a person using an allocentric perspective; and in fact all responses 
were allocentric. In the second condition, which for this participant was the ball 
instruction, the conceptualisation changes entirely. From the first trials, the 
participant starts talking about adopting a perspective from above, though not in 
the manner expected: "pretending like I've - dropped a penny down and it's going 
to the right and then it's fallen out and then the penny would have fallen out to the 
right. So to come back up to me it would have had to go to my left, um - so it 
would have to go back up to my left. So it's the one on the left". Although the 
direct references to dropped pennies stop after a while, the retrospective report 
again confirms that this unexpected perspective, which combines an egocentric 
concept with a view from above but nevertheless yields consistent allocentric 
results, was kept up during this condition. Somewhat surprisingly, another 
participant (no. 8) reports similar concepts following the ball instruction, as in "a 
 ball is dropping down through the hole". Following the bike instruction, 
participant no. 71 goes back to the previous logic of turning back, as evidenced by 
verbalisations such as "because I turned right I'd have to go back in the left 
direction" (yielding allocentric results in 14 out of 17 cases rather than the 
egocentric type expected with the bike instruction).  
 
To conclude, the case studies suggest a range of metacognitive strategies 
that participants adopted in order to find consistent solutions to the tunnel tasks in 
the neutral condition, and subsequently to follow the instructions in the ball and 
bike conditions. However, these strategies and efforts did not lead to a change in 
the behavioural results, in spite of the conscious effort invested in changing 
perspective. During the tunnel experience itself, participants said little more than 
'left' and 'right' (or more complete sentences containing these terms), but then 
pointed to decisive concepts that led to consistent decisions after the journey was 
completed. These concepts varied considerably between participants and 
corresponded to the notions of allocentric and egocentric reference systems only 
to a limited degree. 
Discussion 
In this study, we aimed to gain insights into human understanding of orientation in 
desktop virtual reality scenarios, motivated by earlier research associating worse 
performance and enhanced cognitive effort with desktop VR navigation as 
compared to settings involving physical motion. Specifically, we addressed 
participants' verbalisations in a simple virtual navigation scenario called the tunnel 
task, which has frequently been used in the literature to test orientation skills and 
reference system proclivity (e.g., Goeke et al., 2015; Gramann et al., 2005; 
 Schönebeck et al., 2001). Our results highlight a range of ways in which 
participants conceptualise this task in an effort to maintain orientation in the 
absence of idiothetic or contextual cues. Their verbalisations alongside task 
performance and the reported metacognitive strategies corresponded only in a 
limited way to the spatial reference systems humans are known to use and 
verbalise in settings involving contextual cues and physical motion. Instead, they 
reflected highly varied ways of cognitively representing the scene. In the 
following, we will briefly discuss our study in relation to the earlier literature 
using the tunnel task, before turning specifically to our three research hypotheses 
and their implications in light of the wider literature.  
Although our empirical design differed from earlier studies in a number of 
respects as detailed above, our behavioural data correspond to previous results 
(e.g. Goeke et al., 2015; Gramann et al., 2005, 2006, 2009) in that most 
participants provided consistent responses in the neutral task (which did not 
include further instruction specific for a reference system). To be successful in 
VR tasks, feedback training is often critical for enabling participants to achieve 
the level of accuracy necessary to be accepted for participation (Riecke & Wiener, 
2007). Even though they were not given such explicit feedback, the majority of 
our participants developed a clear preference for choosing one response 
significantly more often than the other. Our results in the neutral task (condition 
1) fell into two groups of similar magnitude; paralleling the earlier literature, these 
could be interpreted as a preference for either egocentric or allocentric reference 
systems.3 Eleven of our 45 participants did not develop a consistent strategy; these 
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 were labeled the ‘no preference’ group. This group corresponds to the minor 
number of participants who would be regularly excluded from further 
participation because they did not reach criterion (or could not be unambiguously 
assigned to a category) in the pre-test or neutral phase. We, however, consider the 
existence of this group a natural consequence of the cognitive challenges involved 
in this task, as evidenced throughout the analysis in various ways. While the 
preference groups soon settled for a strategy to solve the tunnel task, participants 
with no preference remained the slowest to make a choice in all three conditions 
(see Appendix 3). This delay in response could be an indicator for extended 
thought processes and/or indecisiveness.  
While in other studies physical movements (e.g. turning) improved 
performance (e.g. Riecke & Wiener, 2007; Wraga et al. 2004), participants 
requested to point over their shoulder back to the origin of the journey did not 
significantly differ from those who had to choose one out of two arrows, except 
for a tendency to produce "egocentric" results more consistently. Arguably, the 
experience of a physical motion is more important during navigation than after it, 
i.e. at the time of pointing back to the entrance. In any case, our results show that 
complications in conceptualising the tunnel journey and subsequently identifying 
the homing direction cannot be traced back to the display of arrows on the screen, 
as might have been speculated.  
Altogether, our behavioural results mirror previous findings with respect to 
the general distribution of response patterns, allowing us to address the cognitive 
challenges concerning orientation in desktop VR scenarios. Our first hypothesis 
                                                                                                                                 
by the training or feedback procedures in such studies. The result that two distinct preference 
groups emerged in our data is sufficient for the purposes of the current study (in terms of 
comparability with earlier results). 
 concerned verbalisability. Based on the literature on reference systems, 
orientation, and language as a representation of spatial concepts, we expected that 
participants would find ways of describing cognitive strategies in spite of the 
scarcity of perceptual input. In this respect, the participants' responses in 
questionnaires as well as verbalisations revealed a complex picture. The journey 
itself appeared to have been experienced in a fairly intuitive manner, leading to 
relative simple and uniform verbalisations mostly reflecting the tunnel's curves to 
the left or right. As such, the tunnel experience may be unproblematic; the tunnel's 
curves can simply be represented in their directionality, without any potential 
orientation issues or reference system divergences.  
Following navigation, corresponding to previous studies, our participants 
were asked to make a conscious choice between arrows, or shoulders, to indicate 
the direction they came from. In other words, they were challenged to transfer the 
visually observed, but not physically experienced, navigation experience from the 
two-dimensional screen to an imagined three-dimensional situation. This 
challenge corresponds to other desktop VR navigation studies where participants 
are asked make a spatial orientation judgement based on a scene shown on a 
screen, except that the tunnel task scenario was designed to exclude the known 
influence of environmental cues (Kelly et al., 2008; Török et al., 2014). Our 
verbalisation data suggest that participants used diverse kinds of metacognitive 
strategies to solve this task. There are various indications that at least some of the 
participants employed cognitive shortcuts (such as the tunnel went to the left, 
therefore the entrance must be to the right) to identify the homing direction even 
without relying on their disembodied virtual navigation experience. Many 
participants furthermore reported confusion and described how they consciously 
 changed their procedures due to learning effects. The outcome of these changes 
could to some extent be traced in the behavioural results.  
If participants had been able to solve the orientation task without 
conscious strategies, verbalisations should have been less rich and diverse. As 
specified in H1a, based on the literature we expected that verbalisations might 
clearly relate to previously identified verbalisations of allocentric or egocentric 
navigation. This would have yielded a more uniform verbalisation data set falling 
into two categories, possibly corresponding in nature to our two first case studies. 
However, these were exceptional cases rather than consistent patterns throughout 
the data. We conclude that the cognitive challenges involved in orienting in 
desktop VR scenarios are profound enough, in the absence of environmental cues, 
to trigger conscious and verbalisable strategies that support participants in making 
consistent judgements across trials.   
Our second hypothesis concerned individual differences. Based on 
previous research using the tunnel task we could expect two distinct kinds of 
behavioural responses, which is also what we found. However, the verbalisation 
data did not fall into corresponding patterns associated with allocentric and 
egocentric reference systems, or any other reference system categorisations such 
as those proposed specifically for language by Levinson (2003) or Taylor and 
Tversky (1996). Neither did participants producing egocentric responses 
exclusively describe their experience from an egocentric point of view, nor did 
those producing allocentric responses consistently focus on the spatial trajectory 
from an objective, outside perspective. Instead, without consistent relations to the 
behavioural patterns, the verbal descriptions uniformly represented the tunnel's 
curves to the left and right, but were highly diverse when representing the 
orientation task itself. Although the verbal data showed slightly enhanced use of 
 linguistic survey-type indicators produced by participants with an allocentric 
behavioural preference, numbers of survey-type indicators were very low 
throughout, and many of the participants never used any such indicators at all. 
This is in spite of the fact that one of the linguistic indicators of the survey 
perspective, 'above', was used in the ball instruction and might therefore have 
primed the participants to use it directly in their verbalisations. In fact, this term 
was used more frequently in the ball condition than any of the other linguistic 
indicators. This marginal priming effect can account for the observation that 
survey indicators were used somewhat more in this condition than in others, 
without presupposing a survey-type representation. 
As revealed by the qualitative analysis, a consistent allocentric 
conceptualisation was hardly ever reflected in a verbal data set (with the exception 
of one single participant). This result stands in contrast to the literature on survey 
(associated with allocentric) vs. route (associated with egocentric) representations 
in language (e.g., Taylor & Tversky, 1996; Wang, 2012), where different 
conceptualisations consistently lead to different linguistic description types, even 
though the linguistic indicators as such may depend on the task context (e.g., 
Tenbrink et al., 2010). Here, in contrast, the spatial terms used by the participants 
did not seem to differ according to their behavioural responses, irrespective of the 
analytical framework for linguistic analysis. Participants consistently preferred 
projective terms throughout, without any associated linguistic patterns that could 
reveal any differences in underlying reference systems. 
One reason for these results might be as follows. The assumption that an 
allocentric reference system is used by a subset of participants essentially 
presupposes that no particular orientation is needed to assess the corresponding 
homing direction. In fact, allocentric reference systems are typically associated 
 with survey knowledge about the relative relationship of objects or entities to each 
other, independent of the human's current orientation (Klatzky, 1998; Levinson, 
2003; Burgess et al., 2004). However, in the tunnel task participants actually 
depend on the stability of their head direction. Rather than being able to lose track 
of orientation and imagine themselves as a point rather than an intrinsically 
oriented entity, they need to keep their current orientation stable no matter how 
their path curves. Thus they derive the relative position of the entrance from their 
own line of sight, which remains unchanged. As an outcome, even if they develop 
a map-like ("survey") knowledge of the tunnel journey, in order to identify the 
homing direction they still need to relate to their own orientation.  
Moreover, there is no way of excluding that participants who imagine 
themselves as aligning with the tunnel's curves (changing their orientation) also 
develop survey knowledge along the way. In effect, then, the main difference 
between the two kinds of homing directions lies in whether or not the participants 
imagined turning their head during travelling. This interpretation corresponds to 
references to "turners" vs. "non-turners" in Gramann's work (e.g., Gramann et al., 
2005), but it does not necessarily imply distinct reference systems. Previous 
findings on reference systems suggested that shifts or inconsistencies of 
perspective lead to worse performance and thus involve higher cognitive effort 
(Shelton & McNamara, 2004; Török et al., 2014). This should induce participants 
to prefer the egocentric response pattern, which corresponds to the visual input. In 
line with this assumption, Klatzky et al. (1998) postulated that a failure to update 
one's head position is simply an error, rather than representing an alternative 
conceptualisation. Riecke & Wiener (2007) and Riecke (2008) further suggested 
that some of the left-right confusions cannot simply be traced back to a failure to 
update one's head position, since such a conceptualisation would have led to 
 different results in their study. Their results rather suggest that participants 
actually failed to understand the implications of a virtual spatial environment. All 
of these authors agreed, however, that participants can be trained by explicit 
instruction and feedback to provide correct responses.  
This leads us to our third hypothesis, which concerned conceptual 
flexibility. When Gramann et al. (2005) made speakers aware of different ways of 
conceptualising the tunnel task and instructed them to use a particular one, this 
had consistent effects on their behavioural results. We used the same strategy in 
order to trace effects on verbalisations and metacognitive strategies; however, we 
wished to rule out that participants simply conformed to the experimenter's 
expectations after having been told to adopt the other kind of reference system 
than the one they had been using before. This would be possible by choosing the 
other arrow than the one they would have chosen without the instruction. In 
contrast to Gramann et al. (2005), therefore, our participants did not receive any 
such feedback. 
While the neutral condition yielded clearcut and consistent behavioural 
results that generally conformed to previous studies as described above, the results 
of the two other conditions came as a surprise. Contrary to the results reported by 
Gramann et al. (2005), our participants failed to adopt the suggested 
conceptualisations. In fact, there was no indication (neither behaviourally nor 
verbally) that they changed their concepts and strategies at all. Therefore, it stands 
to reason that, although participants can be trained to choose a different solution 
to the one they had previously employed, they do not necessarily adopt a different 
conceptual representation on the basis of a verbal description, at least not without 
correcting feedback. 
 The idea (outlined above) that the two kinds of responses may not 
correspond to distinct underlying reference systems provides a suitable 
explanation why participants in our study consistently failed to adopt the 
alternative reference systems suggested by the instructions in the bike and ball 
conditions. These descriptions do not provide a good match with the cognitive 
strategies involved in (mentally) turning the head as opposed to trying to maintain 
the current orientation during navigation, nor are they suited to induce or remedy 
a left-right confusion that has its roots in a fundamental misconception of the 
virtual environment. Accordingly, the verbalisation data collected in our study 
reflected the participants' sincere attempts to adopt the recommended 
conceptualisation, together with their consistent failure to draw any meaningful 
conclusions from these instructions that would have led to a change of reference 
systems.  
Conceivably, a different formulation of the instructions for adopting a 
specific reference system might have been more effective. However, these 
instructions were taken directly from previous research that led to far-reaching 
conclusions (e.g., Gramann et al., 2005). Moreover, it seems unlikely that a fairly 
superficial modification would have led to substantially different outcomes. 
 However, there is another consideration leading to an alternative 
explanation that cannot be ruled out by our data. Our results might be an artefact 
of our version of the task, triggered by our efforts to elicit metacognitive 
representations via concurrent verbalisation and questionnaires. Also the real-
world pointing condition may have enhanced metacognitive strategies to a higher 
extent than arrows on the screen. Thus, in other studies that do not employ these 
features, participants may not necessarily use the same metacognitive strategies, 
 nor use cognitive shortcuts. However, we consider this interpretation unlikely for 
the following reasons.  
First, our results are consistent with previous insights gained across VR 
scenarios concerning the considerable challenge of achieving reliable spatial 
updating results (e.g., Klatzky et al., 1998; Riecke et al., 2007, 2012; Wraga et al., 
2004). Our findings provide crucial insights into the cognitive processes involved 
in this challenge, and participants' ways of dealing with them. In the absence of 
further cues, they establish a logical or imaginative concept that serves to anchor 
their orientation in such a way as to allow for a consistent judgement of direction. 
This is in line with previous findings that participants can learn to establish and 
track a reference direction if they know about future demands in a setting not 
involving active movement (Mou et al., 2009). 
Second, the present study was (among other aspects) motivated by 
informal discussions with people who had experienced the tunnel task in versions 
corresponding to the published ones, and who reported a number of cognitive 
strategies that they (consciously) employed. In a subsequent series of pilot 
studies4 participants were not asked to think aloud (i.e., they remained unbiased 
with respect to metacognition while performing the task itself) but were 
subsequently asked to report their experience. They consistently volunteered 
information about cognitive strategies, similar to the informal experience reports 
just mentioned. The linguistic data that we collected in this study were entirely 
within the scope of these earlier observations. Our current study design represents 
a more controlled extension of these experiences in that we aimed to elicit 
                                                
4 PART II NEUROSCIENCE PROJECTS, YEARS 2005/2006 AND 2006/2007. Department of 
Experimental Psychology, University of Cambridge, UK.  
 information about the extent to which participants were already aware about their 
strategies while (rather than only subsequent to) solving the tunnel task.  
Third, it is common practice to explain the tunnel task (and similar ones) 
on a detailed (metacognitive) level to participants so as to ensure consistent 
performance. Thus, some amount of metacognition appears to be considered a 
normal part of this kind of study, and arguably in VR navigation tasks in general. 
Fourth, there is no indication that the task of thinking aloud affected 
participants' performance. Neither do the behavioural results reveal systematic 
differences to previous results, nor does the extensive literature on the effects of 
thinking aloud (e.g., as put forward concisely by Ericsson & Simon, 1993) point 
to distorting effects in a task like the present one. Reactivity effects are found, for 
instance, when verbalisation interferes with the natural flow of thoughts while 
solving a problem, or when reports are elicited that exceed the range of thoughts 
retrieved directly from memory (Ericsson, 2002). In light of the consistency of our 
observations with previous findings, it seems unlikely that participants' behaviour 
was influenced to such a high degree that substantially different cognitive 
processes were activated by the task of thinking aloud.  
This is particularly true for our neutral condition, which was carried out 
paralleling previous studies using the tunnel task paradigm. To our knowledge, no 
other studies are available that directly test whether participants can be persuaded 
to use a specific conceptualisation by verbal instruction only, rather than feedback 
on their performance. Our rather unexpected finding that such instruction had no 
effect on performance should be pursued further, shedding further light on what 
exactly is achieved during training. It seems advisable to test various ways of 
manipulating conceptualisation strategies through explicit instruction and other 
 means, using both think-aloud and non-think-aloud settings so as to further 
explore any possible effects of verbalisation.  
Altogether, the possibility cannot be entirely ruled out that verbalisation 
triggers metacognitive considerations that lead to conceptual divergence in a task 
that has often been assumed (and utilised) as a neutral indicator of basal, 
unconscious cognitive strategies. For this reason, the outcome of our work must 
necessarily remain somewhat inconclusive. Two alternative explanations are 
available in the assessment of our results. On the one hand, the reported 
complicated and often contradictory metacognitive strategies may be taken as 
evidence that human preferences for allocentric vs. egocentric reference systems 
are so basal that the attempt to draw participants' attention to them directly leads 
to confusion and distortion of results. A consequence of this would be to keep 
participants unaware of the options as much as possible in order to avoid this 
complication caused by the metacognitive level. On the other hand, if participants 
use metacognition in the tunnel task even without being asked to do so via 
verbalisation, questionnaires and the like, the behavioural results may be a 
reflection of a wide variety of underlying (at least partially rational and conscious) 
cognitive strategies. Our results strongly suggest that at least some of these 
strategies are entirely unrelated to the binary conceptual distinction of egocentric 
vs. allocentric reference systems known from the literature. If this is the case, the 
tunnel task is not a suitable tool for assessing generic human preferences for 
reference systems on a basal, unconscious level. 
More generally, our results suggest that desktop-based VR navigation 
involves conceptualisations and cognitive processes that differ fundamentally 
from real world navigation, at least with respect to basic processes of orientation 
and spatial updating. This resonates with the vast amount of evidence pointing to 
 the supportive effects of active physical movement and idiothetic cues (Klatzky et 
al., 1998; Wraga et al., 2004), as well as notions of embodiment (Mallot & 
Basten, 2009; Wilson, 2002). How we perceive our environment, and how we 
interact with it, is affected fundamentally by basic sensorial information derived 
directly from our physical immersion in the environment (Zetzsche, Wolter, & 
Schill, 2008; Zetzsche et al., 2009). Accordingly, there are natural limits to what 
VR without actual motion can achieve as a tool for research in spatial cognition 
(Taube, Valerio, & Yoder, 2013). Fortunately, increasingly resources exist that 
allow for a simulation of embodiment in virtual space, such as virtuspheres, VR 
goggles, caves (Waller et al., 2007), and the like, all of which however come with 
challenges of their own (Fröhlich & Wachsmuth, 2013; Marsh et al., 2013). In 
some respects, navigating in the real world will remain unique.  
Conclusion and Outlook 
We addressed the verbalisability, awareness, and metacognitive strategies 
involved in dealing with the known orientation problems in desktop VR settings. 
To rule out reliance on environmental cues, we used the perceptually sparse 
tunnel task, a well-established paradigm that has frequently been used to identify 
reference system proclivities and orientation skills in humans. Our results have 
implications for the significance of the tunnel task in this regard, as well as the 
nature of spatial updating in desktop VR in general.  
With respect to the tunnel task, our analysis of metacognitive strategies did 
not provide conclusive support for the use, in this context, of the two basal 
reference systems that are generally referred to as allocentric and egocentric in the 
literature. While the behavioural results collected in the neutral phase of our study 
(with a neutral instruction) were comparable to previous studies using the tunnel 
 task, participants failed to adopt a different reference system based on verbal 
instruction. Moreover, the verbal representations collected during and after the 
task, along with a range of questionnaire items, were not consistent with the 
assumption of two distinct homogeneous groups of participants whose cognitive 
representation differed systematically along the lines of spatial representation. 
Instead, the participants' explicit considerations pointed to a broad range of 
cognitive strategies employed to reach consistent solutions across trials.  
While the alternative explanation cannot be ruled out that these results are 
an artefact of our study design, they nevertheless correspond to previous insights 
in the literature pointing to a systematic human error in spatial updating tasks in 
virtual environments (Klatzky et al., 1998; Riecke & Wiener, 2007). We have to 
conclude that, as things stand, there can be no certainty concerning what the 
tunnel task is actually measuring. As shown by abundant previous results reported 
in the literature, there is little doubt that there are systematic differences between 
participants categorised (based on the tunnel task) as having 'allocentric' or 
'egocentric' response patterns (e.g., Goeke et al., 2015; Gramann et al., 2006, 
2009, 2010). However, our present results along with the earlier findings highlight 
the possibility that these patterns may not be directly related to conceptual 
representations that are as basic to spatial cognition as allocentric vs. egocentric 
reference systems.  
With respect to spatial updating in desktop VR in general, it appears that 
the transfer of the visual two-dimensional information to a conceptualised three-
dimensional world poses a major cognitive challenge that frequently affects 
performance. Previous work suggested that these difficulties can be overcome 
with training and explicit feedback. Our findings highlight that untrained humans 
 develop their own individual strategies to achieve a consistent reference direction 
so as to maintain orientation in virtual space. Beyond these options (training or 
individual solutions), reliable experiments addressing orientation and spatial 
updating performance in VR would require systems as sophisticated as, for 
instance, the HIVE (Waller et al., 2007), which involves an immersive 
environment allowing for natural movement almost equivalent to real world 
settings. Since this is impractical for most research labs and impossible for most 
types of neurocognitive studies to date, desktop-based navigation studies are 
likely to continue to play an important role in spatial cognition research. To some 
extent and depending on the research goals, results from desktop VR settings can 
provide valuable evidence about human spatial skills (Hegarty et al., 2006). 
However, conclusions on orientation-related performance that are collected in less 
sophisticated settings will need to be treated with caution. 
In future research, a more direct comparison between strategies, 
conceptualisations, and metacognitive considerations employed in virtual reality 
tasks as opposed to real world navigation is needed. Experimental designs need to 
be developed that are suitable for a direct alignment between both kinds of tasks, 
testing the predictions derived from the notion of conceptual errors, diverse 
cognitive strategies, and basal reference systems, as well as addressing the 
metacognitive effects of explicit training. Given the complexity of the real world 
and the many ways in which humans are perceptually immersed in it, it may never 
be possible to create a controlled virtual representation that adequately accounts 
for the full range of human cognitive processes active during navigation.   
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 Appendix 1: Instruction Phase 1 
In this experiment, you will travel through a virtual tunnel.  
A single trial will look like this: first a small cross will appear in the centre 
of the screen, which you should focus on. You will then see the beginning of a 
virtual tunnel. Each tunnel starts with a straight segment followed by a curve and 
ends with another straight segment. It will look as though you are “moving” 
forward into the depth of the tunnel through straight and curved segments. 
Imagine that the first segment points straight ahead into the depth of the simulated 
space.  
When the tunnel disappears behind you, you stop moving while the screen 
turns black. 
[ARROW CONDITION:] Then two arrows will appear, pointing towards 
the starting point of the tunnel, the tunnel entrance. Your task is to decide which 
one of the two arrows represents the correct direction towards the tunnel entrance 
(as the crow flies). If it is the right arrow, please press the right mouse button; if it 
is the left arrow, please press the left button. Take your time to make your 
decision – we are not interested in how fast you respond. If you lost orientation 
during the journey through the tunnel, choose the arrow that you feel most likely 
represents the correct answer. 
Please think aloud about what is happening, both while travelling through 
the tunnel and also when you are deciding which is the correct arrow. Say 
anything that comes to mind about what you are thinking and doing, no matter 
what it is, the way you just practiced it. 
 [POINTING CONDITION:] During this time, please point back over your 
shoulder to where the starting point of the tunnel (the tunnel entrance) should be, 
in a straight line (as the crow flies). Please say aloud in which direction you are 
pointing, back to the right over your right shoulder, or back to the left over your 
left shoulder. Take your time to make your decision – we are not interested in how 
fast you respond. If you lost orientation during the journey through the tunnel, 
choose the direction that you feel most likely represents the correct answer. When 
you are done with pointing and talking, start the next tunnel by clicking on the 
mouse. 
Please think aloud about what is happening, both while travelling through 
the tunnel and also when you are deciding where to point back over which of your 
shoulders. Say anything that comes to mind about what you are thinking and 
doing, no matter what it is, the way you just practiced it. 
  
 Appendix 2: Questionnaire following phase 1 
Motivation: Gramann et al. (2005, and elsewhere) suggest that the 
systematic distinctions between participants' responses can be explained by the 
fact that an egocentric perspective means conceptualising turning one’s head 
while navigating, while an allocentric perspective means keeping one’s head 
stable. However, at a closer look, various possible conceptualisations might lead 
to different kinds of consistent results. For example, it is also possible that 
humans do not conceive themselves as moving through the tunnel, but rather 
conceive the tunnel as moving through or passing by them while the body remains 
static (corresponding to their actual proprioception, although the tunnel is not 
actually moving through them). The instruction explicitly states: "During this 
simulation, you are "moving” forward into the depth of the simulated space 
through straight and curved segments". Although this instruction emphasises self 
rather than tunnel movement, there is no independent way of ensuring that this 
corresponds to the participants' actual conceptualisations. If participants 
conceived of the tunnel journey in this alternative way, this may have led to a 
systematic distortion of the conceptualisation of the entrance location. 
Another complication concerns the direction of pointing at the end of the 
journey. Participants may either conceptually turn around to face the tunnel's exit 
and retrace the tunnel's journey to return to the starting point, or keep their current 
orientation, representing the arrow as extending to their back or side. The 
distinction can be imagined by comparison with a real-world path integration 
experiment, in which participants travel along several path segments including 
curves (perhaps blind-folded) and are then asked to indicate the homing direction 
by a gesture. Then they may turn around to point to the start location, rather than 
trying to point while remaining oriented in the direction of the previous path. In 
 the real world, this will not have any disruptive effects because the experimenter 
can directly assess the pointing arrow. However, in the virtual environment the 
two possibilities will have two exactly opposing results. The relevant part of the 
instruction in Gramann et al. (2005) is: "At the end of the tunnel, you stand still 
while viewing outside of the last segment (the last segment will stay on screen for 
a little while). Then, after a short time, two arrows will appear, pointing towards 
the starting point of the tunnel, the tunnel entrance. Your task is to decide which 
one of the two arrows represents the correct direction towards the tunnel 
entrance." 
This instruction suggests that the orientation of "viewing outside" should 
be maintained when the arrows appear. Nevertheless participants might 
involuntarily infer that they should turn to look back in order to assess whether the 
arrow points in this same direction. Thus, in theory, both interpretations are 
available, although the instruction advocates "standing still". Accordingly one 
participant in a pilot study5 pointed out, "on occasion I was not sure which arrow 
was correct and whether it should go back down the tunnel or point direct to the 
entrance." 
To address the possibility of such alternative conceptualisations we 
administered a questionnaire asking participants explicitly about what they did, or 
thought they did, as follows.  
 
1. Did you feel that you were moving through the tunnel? 
2. Did you feel that the tunnel was moving past you?  
                                                
5 Michael Flower: Strategies for Navigation in a Virtual Tunnel. PART II NEUROSCIENCE 
2005/2006. Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Cambridge, UK. 
 
 3. Did you feel that you were re-orienting your head during the curves? 
4. Did you feel that you were re-orienting your body during the curves? 
5. Did you feel that you were changing the direction in which you were 
looking, as if you were turning your head along with the curves in the 
tunnel?  
6. Or did you feel you were looking straight on in spite of the curves in the 
tunnel? 
7. Did you lean your body into the curves (as if driving a bike leaning into 
the turns of the tunnel)?  
8. Or was it more like walking through the tunnel while seeing yourself from 
a bird’s-eye view? 
9. When you came out of the tunnel, did you keep your orientation constant? 
10. Or did you turn to look at the direction you were coming from?   
11. When you imagined the direction to the start, was it like pointing back 
over your shoulder? 
12. Or was it like pointing in front and to the right or left? 
13. Did you imagine travelling in the tunnel each time you did the task? 
14. Did you generally decide about the correct arrow based on your sense of 
direction? 
15. Or did you (at least sometimes) decide about the correct arrow based on 
logic rather than sense of direction?      
Questions no. 11 and 12 were only given to participants in the arrow condition.  
  
 Appendix 3: Additional analyses 
Response times 
In addition to the main analyses reported in the main text, analysis of 
response times was performed to complement our findings on cognitive processes 
activated for the various conceptualisations and instruction types. For instance, 
Riecke (2012) found significantly shorter reaction times for "egocentric" (turner) 
responses than for "allocentric" (non-turner) responses, pointing to higher 
cognitive effort. We investigated response times where this was feasible, namely 
in the 'arrow' condition in terms of the time elapsed between presentation of the 
two arrows and choosing one out of two arrows by mouse click. Before 
performing statistical comparisons, all relevant data were tested for normality 
using the one-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Lillifors test, and histograms of each 
variable were examined visually. Data were skewed to the left, and were therefore 
transformed by ‘1/ ln (response time)’. After transformation, all variables 
conformed to normality both when testing the actual data and when testing the 
residuals generated by parametric models. 
To test whether the response time of behavioural preference groups 
differed across conditions, we used linear mixed models with group, condition, 
and group*condition interaction as fixed factors; participant, tunnel sequence, and 
sequence of conditions (neutral-ball-bike vs neutral-bike-ball) were used as 
random factors. 
We used Systat version 12.0 for all statistical comparisons, and 
significance is reported using both the conventional α = 0.05 and post-hoc 
Bonferroni test of effect correction. Transformed data are graphically represented 
as back-transformed means ± SEM; because of the back transformation, the 
 graphical representation of the standard errors is not symmetrical. 
Response time differed significantly between the three preference groups 
(linear mixed model: F2,1060-ratio = 80.176, p < 0.0001, fit statistics: 
AIC(corrected) : -5768,090; BIC: -5758.323), and was also significantly different 
between the three conditions (F2,1060-ratio = 3.241, p = 0.04), but there was no 
significant interaction between the two factors (i.e. reference system * condition:  
F2,1060-ratio = 0.671, p = 0.612, Figure 6). 
The group categorised as “ego” (i.e. who showed response patterns 
corresponding to the expectations for an egocentric reference system) always 
responded the fastest. In all three conditions “ego” responses were significantly 
faster as compared to the "no preference" group (neutral: t=7.385, p << 0.001, 
95% confidence interval (=CI) ranges from 0.014 (upper) to 0.006 (lower); bike: t 
= 7.813, p << 0.001, 95% CI ranges from 0.015 to 0.006;  ball: t = 6.785; p << 
0.001, 95% CI ranges from 0.014 to 0.005), and there was a tendency for “ego” 
responses to be faster than “allo” responses, but only in the neutral condition 
(Bonferroni posthoc test of effects Group*Condition: t = -3.230, p = 0.096, 95% 
CI ranges from -0.010 to 0.000). Participants without a clear preference showed 
the longest response times, with responses significantly slower than in the "allo" 
group during the ball condition (t = 4.029; p << 0.002, 95% CI ranges from 
0.0013 to 0.001) and the bike condition (t = 4.958; p << 0.001, 95% CI ranges 
from 0.0014 to 0.003).  
 
  
Figure 6: Preference across conditions (showing interaction for groups and 
condition). Back-transformed means ± SEM for all preference categories. 
Response time (ms) = Time between presenting arrows on the screen and time 
clicking on. Significant comparisons of main conditions: ego – allo: p < 0.001, 
ego – neither: p<0.001, allo –neither: p <0.001, neutral – bike: < 0.05. 
 
Analysis of possible gender differences 
Because of earlier results on differences between men and women in spatial 
orientation and strategies (e.g. Goeke et al. 2015; Hegarty et al., 2006; Moffat et 
al., 1998; Kim et al., 2007; Picucci et al., 2011), we addressed the distribution of 
response strategies according to gender. We could not detect any gender bias in 
our data (x2 (df =1, N=45), p=0.219). The same proportion of male (38.5%) and 
female (34.4%) participants changed or lost their initial preference (Figure 7). 
Both sexes showed both preferences (egocentric: 13 females, 9 males; allocentric: 
!
 10 females, 2 males) or no preference (9 females, 2 males); in both sexes 
egocentric preference was dominant. 
 
Figure 7: Distribution of behavioural results according to gender. Solid white: 
number of participants whose preferences were not changed; solid gray: number 
of participants whose preferences changed after instructions. 
